24/1/2018 11:30Taub 301


Recent Developments in Linkography-Based Cyber Security

Robert Mitchell

Sandia National Laboratories

Cyber attacks on critical cyber systems are not decreasing in frequency or complexity. Aggressors choose the time and place of these engagements; protectors must identify, research and develop defensive techniques that provide an asymmetric advantage. A static, data-driven, preventative, automated defense is a losing strategy; an effective defense must be dynamic, behavioral, responsive and capitalize on a human in the loop. We propose human and machine performed linkography to detect, correlate, attribute and predict attacker behavior and present a moving, deceptive target. Recently, our team generated a technology transfer strategy for linkography based cyber security, proposed algorithms to extract and refine linkograph ontologies and subsessionize our input stream and completed our previous related machine learning work. Linkography has been in the literature for decades, and our investigation indicates it is an open, fertile topic for basic and applied cyber security research.

Bio: Dr. Robert Mitchell is currently a member of technical staff at Sandia National Laboratories. He received the Ph.D, M.S. and B.S. from Virginia Tech. Robert served as a military officer for six years and has over 12 years of industry experience, having worked previously at Boeing, BAE Systems, Raytheon and Nokia. His research interests include game theory, linkography, moving target defense, computer network operations, network security, intrusion detection and cyber physical systems. Robert has published 23 peer reviewed articles.

31/1/2018 11:30Taub 301


Closing the Loop on Secure Operating System Design

Amit Levy

Stanford University

Secure system design should be guided by two principles: (1) system security should not impede third-party developers, who are often the main source of innovation, and (2) systems that secure third-party extensions also improve security by reducing the amount of specially-privileged first-party code.

Unfortunately, very few systems today adhere to these principles. This is not merely a result of poor system building. It is hard to design highly extensible systems that are both secure and useful. Moreover, the research community often fails to evaluate novel designs under real-world usage by actual practitioners. As a result, many promising research approaches remain difficult to adopt in practice.

I'll describe Tock, an operating system for microcontrollers we designed with these principles in mind. I'll discuss how we continuously evaluate Tock by engaging with practitioners, and how lessons from practitioners have fed back into the system's design.

Bio: Amit Levy is a PhD student at Stanford University, in the Stanford Secure Systems lab and Stanford Information Networks Group. He holds M.Sc's in Computer Science from Stanford and University of Washington and a B.Sc in Computer Science and Economics from University of Washington.

Amit works with David Mazieres in the Secure Computer Systems group and Phil Levis in the Stanford Information Networks Group. Amit's research involves building secure operating systems, distributed security, and networks, often with the aid of programming language. His work has been published in systems, security and programming language conferences including SOSP, OSDI, USENIX Security and ICFP. Recently, he's been working on a new secure operating system for low-memory microcontrollers, called Tock.